

EXHIBIT NO. 7

(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the Opama radar detector station, 7 December 1944. This map is printed as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

EXHIBIT NO. 8

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CONFIDENTIAL

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB 26 OCTOBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-

sible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Ass't Adjutant General.

5 Incls:

- Incl 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
- Incl 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
- Incl 3—Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
- Incl 4—Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
- Incl 5—Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.

(Incl. #1)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 108.

To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.

1. Operational Orders

(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 1 December)

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 2 December)

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction

(a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through members connected with the said forces of that period.

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources

- (1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
- (2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.
- (3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
- (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

III. Organization of Attacking Force

- First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
- Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
- Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)
- Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
- Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
- First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division)
- Supply Force (8 Transports)
- Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy

- Sunk—2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)
- 1 Destroyer
- 1 Transport
- Seriously Damaged—4 Battleships
- 4 Heavy Cruisers
- Aircraft shot down or burned—over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return—27 aircrafts

N. B.—As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

(Incl #2)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 123

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofujima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American

negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,

Rear Admiral, I. J. N.

Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl #3)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 130

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

[2] The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. NAKAMURA,
Rear Admiral, IJN.

Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl #4)

[1]

QUESTIONNAIRE

17 OCTOBER 45.


To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral ———, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
2. When?
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922—any time such a proposal *first* was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion).
3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.?
4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.
(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)
5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.
(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 1941)
6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I. ?; Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what?)
- [2] Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? (e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) **NOTE:** When I say Plan, I differentiate between *plans* or staff studies and the actual *orders* issued to put the plan in effect.
 10. When did this work begin?
 11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
 12. When was the plan finally approved?
 13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to ——— ——— ——— The Amassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc) **NOTE:** Names of individuals and agencies are both desired—for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also: state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.
 14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
 15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?
 16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
 17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
 18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
- [3] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor:
 20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss:
 - a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
 - b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
 - c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both fleet units and air units) selected?
 - d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
 - e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
 - f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
 - g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?
 - h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include:
 - Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
 - Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
 - Time each group was to strike its target.
 - Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, and other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon.)
- [4] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:
 - a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
 - b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
 - c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.

NOTE: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.
34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
- [5] 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack. (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g. "All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. ——— who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).")
45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45)GB

1 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (referred to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl. 1)

1032

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

Pp. 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

Pp. 2 (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)

1. *Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?*
Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. *When was this done?*

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. *Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans?*

No.

4. *If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.*

(No statement.)

Pp. 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. *When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?*

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. *Who made the foregoing decision?*

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. *If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.*

It was not made in conference.

Pp. 4 (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. *What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?*

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. *Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?*

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. *When was the above undertaking started?*

In the first part of September 1941.

11. *Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?*

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

Pp. 5. 12. *When was the final confirmation of this plan made?*

1 Dec. 41.

13. *Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?*

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff

members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff

Navy Minister

Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some

of their personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their

chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

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- (3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

Pp. 7 (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

Pp. 9 Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although

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it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

Pp. 11

(3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken? The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken ?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

Pp. 12

22. *State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.*

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

Pp. 13

23. *How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?*

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

PP 14 24. Explain in detail the organization of the Task Force (ships and air strength).

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was then commander of the AKAOJ Air Unit.)

(1) Ships.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DOYT
Air Attack Force	Under direct commander	Six aircraft carriers AKAGI KAGA SORU SHOKAKU SUICAKU	Air attack
Screening Unit	Com Des Ron 1 Rear Adm CHOKI, Sentaro	One light cruiser Five destroyers URAKAZE ISOKAZE TASINZAE HARAKAZE AIJUNO	Screen; cover
	CinC 1 Air		
Support Force	Fleet, Com Bat Div 3 Rear Adm MIKAWA, Sunichi Vice Adm HAGUMO.	Two battleships HIBI TOKISIMA Two heavy cruisers TOKE GRIKUMA	Screen; support
Task Force			
Patrol Unit	Chaichi Com Sub Div 2 Capt IMAIZUMI, Kijiro	Three submarines I-19 I-21 I-23	Petrol ship lance
Midway Neutralization Unit	Com Des Div 7 Capt KONISHI, Kename	Two destroyers AKEDOMO USHIO	Attack air base on Midway
1 Supply Unit	Captain of ITOKUHO (伊土保) MARU (special duty ship)	Captain of KYOKUTO MARU	Supply
Supply Force		Five tankers KIKYO (吉洋) MARU KYOKUTO MARU KOKUYO (国洋) MARU SUNYOKU (新洋) MARU AKEDOMO MARU	
2 Supply Unit	Captain of TOMO (東) MARU	Three tankers TOMO MARU TOEI (東太) MARU FIFCOE MARU	Supply

Pp. 15 (2) Air Strength.
 (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

Type	Type of airplane	Number of airplanes	Ships on which based	Duty
Airplanes for reconnaissance just before the attack.	Type Zero Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	2	<i>Tone</i> (1)..... <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR and LAHAINA Anchorage just before the attack.
Search-patrol planes..	Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	4	<i>Hiei</i> (1)..... <i>Kirishima</i> (1) <i>Tone</i> (1) <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Patrolling waters around OAHU.

pp 16 (b) Attack Unit

UNIT		COMMANDER	TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT (EACH AIRPLANE)	TARGET
1 Group (SUUDAN)	1 Attack Unit	Comdr. FUJIKIDA		15	Horizontal bombing attack	One 800-kg armor piercing bomb	Battleships
		Lt Comdr. KANEIYUCHI		15			
	2 Attack Unit		Type	50			
	3 Attack Unit	Lt ABE	97	10			
First Attack Unit	4 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. KUDOMI	Carrier	10	Torpado bombing attack	One 800-kg aerial torpedo	Aircraft carriers
	1 Special Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. MURATA	Boomber	12			
	2 Special Attack Unit	Comdr. FUJIKIDA		12			
	3 Special Attack Unit	Lt HAGA		6			
2 Group	4 Special Attack Unit	Lt MATSUMURA	Type 99	8	Dive bombing attack	250-kg land bomb	Air Bases FUJIO Island MAGLARA
	15 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. TAKAHASHI	Carrier	27			
	16 Attack Unit	Lt SAKAMOTO	Boomber	27			
	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt Comdr. ILLYA		9			
3 Group	2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHIGA	Type Zero	9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airbase airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes FUJIO Island MAGLARA MAGLARA MAGLARA MAGLARA
	3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SUGAWAMI	Carrier	9			
	4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt OKAJIMA	Fighter	6			
	5 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SANO		6			
1 Group	6 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. SHIMAZAKI	Type 97 Carrier	27	Horizontal bombing attack	One 250-kg land bomb. Six 6-kg ordinary bombs	Air Bases MAGLARA MAGLARA MAGLARA MAGLARA
	5 Attack Unit	Lt ICHIHARA	Attack Plane	27			
	13 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. KUSA		18			
	14 Attack Unit	Lt KOBAYASHI	Type 99 Carrier	18			
2 Group	11 Attack Unit	Lt IIDA	Boomber	18	Dive bombing attack	One 250-kg ordinary bomb	Aircraft carriers
	12 Attack Unit	Lt MARINO		27			
	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHINDO	Type Zero	9			
	2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHIKAIJŌ	Carrier	9			
3 Group	3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt IIDA	Fighter	9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airbase airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes MAGLARA FUJIO Island MAGLARA MAGLARA
	4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt NANO		9			

pp 17 (c) Combat Air Patrol

Patrols	Type of Airplane	Number of Airplanes	Ship on Which Based	Type of Patrol
Patrol 1	Type Zero	18	LEADI - 9	Direct air escort
			KAQA - 9	
Patrol 2	Carrier	18	SOBU - 9	Airplanes ready on flight deck
			HIRU - 9	
Patrol 3	Fighter	18	SUZUKU - 9	Airplanes ready on danger deck (fueled and armed)
			SUZUKU - 9	

Notes

1. Direct air escort was carried out from an hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset.
2. The patrols alternated every two hours.

(TM SKETCH OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF DANU.)



1. Second Attack Unit.
2. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
3. Dive bombing unit
4. Attack run ordered at 0425 hours.
5. Horizontal Bombing Unit
6. KASUMI
7. HIGGAM
8. FORD Island
9. First Attack Unit.

10. Ordered to deploy at 0310 hours.
11. Attack run ordered at 0320 hours.
12. Dive Bombing Unit.
13. WHEELER
14. Torpedo Bombing Unit.
15. Horizontal Bombing Unit.
16. BARKERS POINT
17. Note: The Fighter Striking Units in each attack operated at will after deploying.

Pp. 18 25. *During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?*

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHŌKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

Pp. 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.

(1) First Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships.

Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

Pp. 20 (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

Reasoning:

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

Pp. 22 (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our

main attack units—the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKMAN.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit—KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEHOE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit.

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field—0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage—0327 hours.

Horizontal Bombing Unit

* Same as above—0235 hours.

Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strafing—0330 hours.

Second Attack Unit.

All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

Pp. 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

Pp. 29 27. *How were midget submarines used?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

Pp. 30 The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

Pp. 31 28. *Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

Pp. 32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. *When did the Task Force begin to form?*

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. *Where was the rendezvous?*

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. *When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?*

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. *Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?*

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. *Did everything proceed according to plan?*

Yes.

Pp. 33 35. *If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?*

(No statement.)

36. *Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?*

No.

37. *Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?*

None.

38. *If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?*

(No statement.)

Pp. 34 39. *Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

Pp. 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. *What damage did the Japanese receive?*

In the First Attack:

Fighter planes	-----	3
Dive bombers	-----	1
Torpedo bombers	-----	5
Total	-----	9

In the Second Attack:

Fighter planes	-----	6
Dive bombers	-----	14
Total	-----	20
Grand total	-----	29

41. *What was the estimated damage to American forces?*

(1) Naval vessels:

Sunk: 4 battleships
1 cruiser
2 tankers

Pp. 36

Heavily damaged: 4 battleships
Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes

Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. *How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?*

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

Pp. 37

43. *Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?*

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

Pp. 38

(Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. *Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?*

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. *If there were, where were these submarines based?*

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. *What were their operation orders?*

Pp. 39

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. *Were reports made during and after the attack?*

When the Task Force and the midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the of 8 December.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. *What damage was sustained by the submarines?*

Pp. 40

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

47. *How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?*

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

End

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45)GB

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945)GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945)GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl 1)

Doc No. 1668

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 OCTOBER 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.
15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

None.

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

EXHIBIT NO. 8-A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 35005 (12 Nov 45) GB

12 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2).

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in compliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75591, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional document is forwarded herewith.

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 45-47 inclusive of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. B.,
Asst Adjutant General.